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This paper presents an analysis of environmental policy in imperfectly competitive
markets. We investigate how environmental taxes should be optimally levied in a pre-
commitment policy game and their e¤ects on social welfare. The paper also examines the
potential impacts of the regulators environmental conscience on policy setting. We start
the analysis with a benchmark model where all players are environmentally dirty in the
marketplace. We then extend the model to the case in which the market is composed of
a mix of dirty and clean strategic players. We show that, in both cases, the regulator
must necessarily trade o¤ between regulation of environmental quality and the industry
production ine¢ ciency problems. Furthermore, the results show how higher levels of con-
cern for environmental issues outweigh the under taxation problem that arises in order
to avoid further reductions in welfare. Finally, we show that the existence of clean play-
ers produces positive social externalities. Under an ex ante environmental policy game,
higher social welfare outcomes are possible.
Key Words: Environmental Policy, Emissions Tax, Environmental Conscience, Social
Welfare, Strategic Behavior, Oligopoly Competition.
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Introduction
Much environmental economic research e¤orts have been put into studying environmen-
tal instruments as a mean of improving and protecting the environment. Market-based
instruments are attracting increasing attention and provide stronger long term incentives
than other environmental policy instruments (OECD, 2006a, 2010). Environmental taxes
Part of this research has received nancial support from FCT, Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia,
project "PTDC/EGE-ECO/114477/2009".
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2are one of the major features of the market-based instruments in designing environmental
policies, and are one of the most widely used and historically experienced instruments2.
However, there remains a high potential for a wider use of these instruments especially
to slow down global warming, provided that they are properly designed (Nordhaus, 2007;
Kerkhof et al. 2008).
In theory, environmental taxes have many advantages when compared to other instru-
ments and policies. They allow least-cost abatement, raise governmental revenues in part
for scal consolidation, provide incentives to polluters to internalize the negative e¤ects of
their activities, etc.3 Therefore, it is well known today that the proper design of environ-
mental taxation does not only depend on the environmental damage caused by economic
activities but it also depends on other economic variables and distortions (Bovenberg and
de Mooij, 1994).
The structure and the e¢ ciency properties of emissions taxes have been widely ana-
lyzed under perfect competition and monopoly. More recently, there has been a growing
interest in the analysis of market-based instruments under oligopoly conditions, especially
duopolistic markets. Emissions taxes are not immune to market power concerns and to
strategic behavior. In addition, under imperfectly competitive conditions, environmental
regulation a¤ects productsenvironmental features and the performance of the market.
In setting environmental policy, Pigouvian taxation is regarded as a benchmark. Under
perfect competition, the desired internalization of the external damages is complete, and
the optimal Pigouvian tax is the same for all polluters. Buchanan (1969) was the pio-
neer in challenging the Pigouvian tax by considering the other polar case, the monopoly.
He suggested that the monopolists sub-optimal level of output is the source of a ba-
sic dilemma for the formulation of policy to regulate externalities. Emissions taxation
provides an incentive for pollution abatement, but, at the same time, raises the rms
marginal cost and thereby induces a reduction in output. Thus, the monopoly power
distorts and a¤ects heavily the tax optimality since the monopoly will simply hold down
its output. Monopolistic market structure leads to a second best solution due to the loss
in e¢ ciency from the contraction in output: the optimal emissions tax is less than mar-
ginal external damages. As a result, when public authorities implement an environmental
2Since 1991, there has been an increase in the number of countries which implement market-based in-
struments, and it looks like there is considerable scope for their much wider use. The OECD (2006b,
2010) shows empirically that many market-based instruments, including taxes, have a positive inuence
on the environmental quality.
3Di¤erent OECD Member States impose emissions taxes on several industries to fund the cleanup of
highly polluted activities such as inactive hazards and to partially subsidize the development of renewable
energies. For example, a regulatory fee on lead paint manufacturers imposed by the State of California
was used in part to fund government programs that addressed the health risks of children exposed to lead
paint.
3policy to protect the environment, they have to take into account the structure of the
market since the implementation may di¤er from one market structure to the other and
since competition and output level may be a¤ected by environmental policy.
The second best solution pioneered by Buchanan is sustainable in polluting industries
performing in more or less imperfectly competitive markets (Ulph, 1996)4. The optimal
taxation has to be modied because environmental taxes are not neutral to the produc-
tion decisions of oligopolists. On the one hand, the taxation reduces the emissions harm
and enhances social welfare. But on the other hand, it raises production costs and con-
sequently reduces the supply of nal products. Since oligopoly undersupplies the market
even without distortional taxes, the emission levy would contract the output further and
diminish welfare in the form of deadweight loss. Optimal environmental taxation needs
to trade-o¤ these e¤ects.
Levin (1985) investigates various forms of taxation in order to control pollution in the
case of Cournot oligopoly market. The author showed that the industry output will fall
due to the tax, but output will also be reallocated across rms as they reach the new
equilibrium. Damania (1996) studied the e¤ects of an emissions tax on the incentives for
oligopolists to acquire clean technologies. The author showed that there are situations in
which the rms may reject the option of acquiring the pollution abatement equipment,
even when this lowers their production costs.
In the case of identical rms, it has been demonstrated that the optimal tax rate is less
than the marginal external damage of pollution (Lee, 1999; Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas,
1996). In related works, it is found that when the market structure is endogenous, the
optimal tax rate under symmetric pollution oligopoly with xed costs is likely to exceed
external damages (Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas, 1995) because free entry may result in
an excessive number of rms.
In markets with homogeneous products, environmental regulation induces an over in-
ternalization of pollution as polluters may react by reducing their output levels (Moraga-
Gonzales and Padron-Fumero, 2002). Thus, environmental policies such as standards
(Farzin, 2003) and Pigouvian taxes fall short of marginal environmental damage due to
the additional reductions of output levels indirectly induced by the policy (Schoonbeek
and de Vries, 2009). Long and Soubeyran (2005) examines asymmetric rms with re-
spect to their production and abatement costs. They considered an oligopolistic pollution
game in a di¤erential setting with symmetric information. The optimal tax under cost
4For an interesting review of the link between environmental regulation and competition, see Heyes
(2009). Requate (2005) gives a complete discussion on the performance of environmental instruments in
the presence of imperfectly competitive output markets.
4asymmetry di¤ers across rms and may facilitate strategic interactions5.
It is clear today that market structures and strategic behaviors, which are a prevalent
real world phenomena, introduce another source of distortion in setting environmental
policy and have substantial implications. In this paper, we move a step further by high-
lighting a way in which the design and implementation of environmental taxes can be
improved by considering the potential impacts of the regulators environmental conscience
on policy design. In order to provide recommendations with respect to optimal taxation,
it is important to understand and acknowledge how changes in the level of concern for
environmental issues a¤ect the tax setting process. To this end, we consider a precommit-
ment environmental policy game in which the regulator, who usually possesses sovereign
authority, occupies a position of leader and commits to a specic emissions tax rule. This
implies that the regulator decision once made remains in force for an extended period of
time while h players respond in the marketplace. This is true in di¤erent policy contexts
where the regulator cannot change its policy decision periodically but must enforce it for
a xed period of time. We determine the optimal policy in two cases: one in which all
players are environmentally dirty; and the second case in which dirty and clean players are
active in the marketplace. We compare taxes and welfare levels under these two di¤erent
outcomes. We then analyze how the results change depending on the various potential
levels of the regulators ecological conscience. Finally, a comparative static analysis is
performed. The intention of these simulations is to provide an illustration of our analyti-
cal results since environmental taxation depends closely on some parameters of the model
which sometimes are inherently di¢ cult to estimate.
Our setting is not a convenient simplication but may characterize strategic interac-
tion in many types of markets where policy changes require long administrative and legal
procedures. Such policy instrument could be potentially applied to regulate some envi-
ronmental externalities where a complex international negotiation must take place and
cannot be readily changed in response to a mix of dirty-clean playersactions. An inter-
national carbon market is a good example of such negotiations. For instance, the energy
sector in many countries around the world is at a crossroads. Environmental regulation
needs to give appropriate incentives for major investments in the energy sector in order
to insure the growing concern of supply and, most importantly, reduce greenhouse-gas
emissions. A wide carbon-energy tax could be a key part of a successful regulation at the
international level. This policy setting is also relevant in the utility industries where play-
5Other market structures have been analyzed in the context of pollution markets where asymmetry has
been mainly treated in a static and duopolistic simultaneous manner (Espinola-Arredondo and Munez-
Garcia, 2013; Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón, 2006, 2003; Amir and Nannerup, 2005; Carlsson, 2000; Xepa-
padeas, 1995; and van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw, 1992).
5ers generates a negative externality for an extensive region or country. Thus, such policy
instrument could be potentially adjusted to deal with greenhouse gases in the U.S. energy
sector, where electricity is produced by rms engaged in a competition à la Cournot (SO2
emissions market or the CO2 emissions in California). Other examples are e­ uents from
some industries polluting surface water such as rivers or lacs. This was the case with the
Rhine river between France and Germany or the Elbe river in Germany.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model.
The optimal environmental policy is examined in section 3. Welfare implications are
discussed in section 4. Conclusions are in section 5. Technical details are given in the
Appendices.
1. The model
Since taxing emissions tends to exacerbate the preexisting distortion in an imperfect
market, the regulator needs to overcome the conict between regulation of environmental
quality and market failures. Policy makers are always facing such situations. In order to
provide recommendations with respect to optimal tax design, we formulate an analytically
tractable model to examine the interlinkages between environmental regulation and the
interindustry production ine¢ ciency problems as closely as possible without questioning
the robustness of our results in general settings. We consider positive fees which can
be sustained only when the market ine¢ ciency emerging from pollution dominates that
stemming from underproduction. We determine the tax rule that induces players to
choose the socially-desirable level of output and emissions, and examine the extent to
which the market structure as well as the level of concern for environmental issues a¤ect
the magnitude of the optimal tax rule.
The assumptions of our model are in line with the related literature (Espinola-Arredondo
and Munez-Garcia, 2013; Antelo and Loureiro, 2009(a), 2009(b)). We assume a game in
which h players are active in the output market and are engaged in a Cournot com-
petition. The model is exible and admits several interpretations in terms of policy
implication.
Let Z = f1; : : : ; hg denotes the set of h players producing a homogeneous nal good.
The term players can be interpreted as rms or countries. In the rst case, a leading
application of the model to goods markets is to wholesale energy market. The regulator
is then a national agency. In the second case, the model may be applied to the current
talks about Kyoto II Agreement. For instance, it is true that we do not know yet the
type of regulatory institutions, including policy instruments and participants, that will
succeed the post-2012 Kyoto Protocol in the multinational e¤orts to stabilize Carbon
6Emissions and Concentrations in the atmosphere6. Therefore, the plausible architecture
may include an industry-specic Global Carbon Tax such as on the energy sector. In this
case, regulation can be performed under the auspices of a Supranational Authority.
The social planner is concerned about environmental harm and uses per-unit tax rule to
maximize the total welfare. For expositional purposes, we assume that players are facing
the following inverse demand function7:
p (Q) = 1 Q (1)
p (Q) denotes the unit price of the good and Q =
Ph
z=1 qz is the total output of the in-
dustry. The assumption of linearity is widely employed in the literature on environmental
regulation and yields analytical tractability.
Emissions are given by ez and depend on the technology of production used by each
player. They can be low or high and thus the corresponding player is considered relatively
clean or dirty. A dirty agent is identied as the player that has a low marginal cost of
production while a clean agent who pollutes less per unit of output, is the one with high
marginal cost of production since it faces higher abatement costs. Emissions are supposed
to be proportional to production levels, qz, in such a way ez (qz) = qz; z 2 Z; if player z
uses a dirty technology, and ez (qz) = zqz; z 2 Z, with 0  z  1 if player z uses a clean
technology. In general, z2Z 6= k2Z , for z 6= k: Thus, we can write:
ez2Z =
(
qz; if the technology used is dirty
zqz; if the technology used is clean
(2)
In the following, it is convenient to assume that z2Z = k2Z = 0 for any z; k 2 Z; z 6= k
for the sake of simplicity. We also assume that a dirty player z must pay a tax per unit of
emissions,  z; which must be set optimally by the regulator. The environmental damage
generated by the production activity is given by the following quadratic convex function:
D =
1
2
d (E)2 > 0 (3)
where E = Pz2Z ez (qz) represents the aggregate level of emissions or total pollution level.
A marginal increase in output, hence, entails a positive and increasing environmental dam-
age, i.e., pollution is convex in output. The positive parameter d is an exogenous variable
6Nordhaus (2007) shows that price-type instruments, such as internationally harmonized carbon taxes,
have major advantages for slowing global warming.
7This demand function is the result of a representative consumer maximization problem with quasi-linear
utility function.
7that captures the regulators valuation of the environment or the ecological conscience
of the regulator8. This type of damage function is commonly used in the literature and
assumes that this damage is exogenous for consumers: they do not take into account the
e¤ect of their consumption decisions on the environment.
We also assume that total costs of production and abatement of each player are linear,
czqz. Thus, we suppose that the technology used exhibits constant returns to scale, namely
for a given state of the nature the marginal cost of production is a constant equal to cz.
A player z 2 Z can adopt either a low or a high value of cz. Thus, an agent may employ
a dirty production technology harming the environment which implies cheap production
costs of the nal good, or may adopt a clean environmental technology by acquiring costly
equipment to reduce the pollution generated by its production process. Such equipment
reduces emissions per unit of output and alters its marginal and average production and
abatement costs. Thus, for each z, the marginal cost of production and abatement in
each period is given by cz 2 f0; czg with
cz =
(
0, if the technology used is dirty
cz; if the technology used is clean
(4)
The regulator follows a mechanical but natural rule for setting the optimal environ-
mental policy. The regulator believes that polluters will behave strategically in the mar-
ketplace and there is a need to understand and acknowledge the potential impacts and
limitations of environmental taxes. To achieve this goal, the regulator maximizes an
un-weighted social welfare function which includes consumer surplus (CS), the players
expected prots
 P
z2Z z

, and the regulators total expected revenue generated by emis-
sion taxes (R), minus the value of environmental damages (D). Thus, we consider the
following social welfare function to evaluate and discuss the e¤ects of these distinct envi-
ronmental measures on welfare grounds:
W = CS +
X
z2Z
z +R D (5)
where revenues are given by9:
R =
X
z2Z
 zez (qz) =
( P
z2Z  zqz, if the used technology is dirty
0 otherwise
(6)
8d can also represent the marginal social damage of environmental pollution or equivalently the degree
of convexity of the damage function.
9Administrative costs associated with environmental taxes are supposed to be negligible.
8Under the specication adopted here, since the social welfare function incorporates
consumers surplus, playersprots, government revenues, and externalities together, then
the optimal environmental tax is able to balance corrections for both negative externalities
and sub-optimal production.
2. The optimal environmental policy
Our game examines an oligopolistic structure with h players under full information.
Since our main goal is to examine the role of strategic behavior in large Cournot oligopoly
and the impact of the regulatorsecological conscience on the tax setting process, this
assumption is quite acceptable10. For instance, the regulators of most OECD member
countries have more accurate information about the technology used in some industries
such as the energy sector, and the resulting environmental damage (OECD, 2006b). This
situation could be considered as a symmetric information context in our setting.
In this section we describe output and environmental taxes in the subgame perfect
equilibrium of the game where all players (h = n+m) are supposed to be dirty, z 2
Z; c = 0. The benchmark case will be used for comparison purposes. Then, we consider
the fragmentation of the market by allowing a group ofm  n players to adopt a clean and
environment-friendly technology, 8m 2 Z; cm > 0: Since a clean player does not pollute,
it will never be taxed whether it competes with a clean or a dirty rival.
2.1. The benchmark case: all players are dirty
In this ex ante pollution-tax game we assume that the regulator acts as a Stackelberg
leader and polluters are the followers. This implies that the regulatory policy must be put
in place at the rst stage, and remains static while players respond in the marketplace.
In the rst stage, before observing the playersoutput decisions, the regulator announces
and commits to a per-unit environmental tax. Thus, the regulator sets  z; z 2 Z in order
to maximize W . In the second period, for any z 2 Z and given  z, polluters compete as
Cournot rivals and decide the level of production qz in order to maximize their prots.
The quantity produced generates a negative externality ez that a¤ects the environmental
quality.
If all players are dirty, then 8z 2 Z; cz = 0: In the rst stage, the regulator sets an
environmental tax dened in the following Proposition.
10As shown in Kurz (2008), asymmetric information in Cournot repeated games leads, under independence
properties and the law of large numbers, to full revelation of the true value of outputs. In the limit, all
forecasts converge with probability 1 to the true value of production levels. The revelation may also
result from direct regulatory oversight, or through other mechanisms such as internal whistleblowers,
disclosures by the media or environmental watchdog groups, or simply due to random events that bring
information into the public domain.
9Proposition 1 In the context of complete information, the optimal environmental tax
imposed on each dirty player if its rival is also dirty is given by:
 z =
hd  1
h (d+ 1)
(7)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that, if all players are dirty and if their strategies are conned to quantity decisions,
then the scal policy that induces the optimal output level is increasing in d:
@ z
@d
() = h (h+ 1)
(h (d+ 1))2
> 0 and
@2 z
@d2
< 0 (8)
This simply means that, as the environmental damages become more severe, the equi-
librium emissions tax increases. This is evident since d represents a higher ecological
conscience of the regulator. Note that for su¢ ciently low values of d, i.e. d  1
h
, the
emission tax collapses to zero. We also can show that the optimal environmental tax is
clearly an increasing function in h, the number of active players in the marketplace, which
is economically intuitive:
@ z
@h
() = d+ 1
(h (d+ 1))2
> 0 and
@2 z
@h2
< 0 (9)
Lemma 1 If all players are dirty in the marketplace, then equilibrium oligopoly values
are:
Q(z) =
1
(1 + d)
; e(z) =
1
h (1 + d)
; p(z) =
d
(1 + d)
; (z) =

1
h (1 + d)
2
CS(z) =
1
2 (1 + d)2
; R(z) =
hd  1
h (1 + d)2
; D(z) =
d
2 (1 + d)2
Proof. Straightforward using equation (7).
It is easy to see that the industry output level, Q(z); is independent of h; the number
of dirty players in the market. The intuition behind this nding is that the regulator
somehow seems to correct the market structure in order to restore e¢ ciency. Furthermore,
the socially optimal output level, Q(z); is decreasing in d, which is quite intuitive, given
the fact that all players are dirty and the parameter d measures the regulators level of
concern for environmental issues. Finally, we can show that, if all players are dirty in
the marketplace, then the social planner sets an environmental tax below the marginal
10
environmental damage, MD(z) =
@D
(z)
@e
(z)
:
 z  MD(z) =
hd  1
h (d+ 1)
  hd
(d+ 1)
=  hd (h  1) + 1
h (d+ 1)
< 0 (10)
Equation (10) shows that, since the tax reduces environmental damage and induces
dirty players to reduce the industry output level in the second stage, the regulator sets
an environmental tax below the marginal environmental damage in order to prevent dirty
players from reducing their output further. This under-taxation is a standard result in
the literature on environmental regulation (Buchanan, 1969).
Proposition 2 In a complete information framework, if all players are dirty then envi-
ronmental regulation in a precommitment policy game yields the following social welfare:
W (z) =
d (2h  1) + h
2h (1 + d)2
(11)
Proof. Straightforward using Lemma 1.
Note that the social welfare function is a positive and increasing function in h which is
economically intuitive:
@W (z)
@h
() = d
2h2 (1 + d)2
> 0 and
@2W (z)
@h2
() =   d
h3 (1 + d)2
< 0 (12)
Furthermore the social welfare function is a decreasing function with the regulators
ecological conscience:
@W (z)
@d
() =  d (2h  1) + 1
2h (1 + d)3
< 0 (13)
The rationale behind this nding lies on the fact that the regulator is maximizing an
un-weighted social welfare function. Since the tax is a¤ecting the oligopolistic competition
in the market and pollutersstrategic behavior, the industry production level is heavily
a¤ected11. Thus the environmental taxes heavily a¤ect consumerssurplus.
From gure 1 it can be seen how welfare changes as a function of the regulators eco-
logical conscience and the number of dirty players in the marketplace. The impact of
changes in d and h on social welfare corresponds to the economic intuition. In gure 1
we can see that welfare decreases as d increases. Furthermore, the social welfare in an
11Recall that Q(z) is a decreasing function with respect to d : an increase in environmental stringency
causes producers to reduce the industry output level in order to reduce emissions.
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oligopolistic market strictly increases as the number of dirty players in the marketplace
increases. Therefore, the curve representing W (z) becomes atter as h increases. This
can be explained by the fact that the regulator has an active role in the determination
of industry output. The social planner uses taxes not only to curb emissions but also
to correct the underproduction that emerges in concentrated market structures. Thus,
the regulator has to be more careful with the market structure as this may have impor-
tant implications for the outcome of environmental regulation in terms of output level,
even if environmental taxes unambiguously reduces global emissions levels. This result is
consistent with the existing literature.
Figure 1: Social Welfare when all players are dirty for 2  h  50; 0:6  d  5:
Much more, under the optimal environmental tax dened in (7) ; as h!1; the social
welfare function approaches to the sum of consumerssurplus and the regulatorrevenues:
lim
h!1
W (z) = lim
h!1

d (2h  1) + h
2h (1 + d)2

= lim
h!1
 
CS(z) +R

(z)
) W (z) ! 2d+ 1
2 (d+ 1)2
(14)
This result is quite intuitive and lies on the fact that, as h ! 1; the equilibrium
converges to the perfect competitive market equilibrium. All players are facing a "tough"
competition and are mainly guided by e¢ ciency criteria and their survival in the market.
Thus, for a su¢ ciently large number of players, prots are equal to zero.
12
2.2. The mixed case: n dirty players and m clean players
The previous discussion considers only homogenous dirty players. Agents heterogeneity
leads to important and interesting additional results. In this section, we extend the
benchmark case to allow the presence of clean players.
Intuitively, in the context of environmental regulation, the presence of clean players in
the marketplace is welfare improving. Furthermore, the tax rate should be smaller in the
mixed case than in the benchmark case where all players are dirty.
To prove our claim, we consider the partition of the market into n dirty players and m
clean players with h = n+m: The regulators program will be identical to the benchmark
case except that Z = f1; : : : ; hg in the rst case will be replaced by Z = N [M where
N = f1; : : : ; ng and M = f1; : : : ;mg. In the following, to ensure tractability of our
model, we assume that all players within the two subgroups are symmetric12: our goal is
to isolate the pure e¤ect of the presence of a group of m clean players while n players are
dirty, on the regulators tax setting mission, holding all other factors unchanged.
This market fragmentation procedure provides a pure test of the multiplicity problem in
the sense that it captures the e¤ect of mixed oligopoly on policy design without changing
the scale of the industry. The partition process of the industry clearly imposes a very
specic relationship, on the one hand between dirty and clean players, and on the other
hand between the social planner and all players in the market.
In fact, environmental taxation inuences pollutersoptimal strategies in two opposite
ways: the tax makes them internalize their pollutant emissions, thus reducing their output
level and the environmental damage that they cause; at the same time, the tax set by
the regulator decreases competition in the market, which reduces the production of the
industry. As a result, a player in the market is facing the following dilemma: in the
presence of emissions taxes, it has a strategic incentive to convince the regulator that it is
using a clean technology (having high level costs), and at the same time it has an incentive
to be perceived as a dirty player by its rival but productively e¢ cient since this enables
the latter to decrease its production while the former increases it. The regulator believing
that the player is clean will set a relatively low environmental tax. But, overabatement
is expensive and the problem facing the players requires them to balance the desire to
appear clean (high costs) against the desire to be e¢ cient in the market and to minimize
12The analysis of the symmetric case provides a basis for comparison. However, the restriction to symme-
try can be relaxed by considering the case where c1  : : :  cz  : : :  ch. In this case, one may assume
that the marginal cost of rm z is given by cz = (z   1) c; where c is a direct measure of cost asymmetry
in the industry (Barros, 1998; Straum, 2006), i.e. the cost gap between producing a clean and dirty
output. Firmsasymmetry might result from di¤erent environment-friendly production technologies. In
order to make sure that the least e¢ cient rm is always active in any possible market structure, it is
necessary to introduce an upper bound on c, c.
13
actual costs (low costs).
Since there exist parameter values such that the optimal strategies are negative, it is
then important to dene the su¢ cient magnitude of our parameters in order to ensure
that the probability of an equilibrium solution having negative quantities is negligible
and all players are going to be active in equilibrium13. To this end we make use of the
following assumptions about the values of c and d.
Assumption 1 The marginal production and abatement cost c carried by the clean tech-
nology is dened by: 0 < c < 1
2
:
Assumption 2 The regulators ecological conscience d must satises: d > d  1+mc(n+m+2)
n(m+1)(1+mc)
:
Under complete information, assumptions (1) and (2) ensure that each dirty player has
to pay a non-negative emissions tax regardless of its rivalstype. Otherwise, if a dirty
player is facing a clean producer, then it will pay a negative tax (i.e. a subsidy) and a
non-negative tax will only hold in the case of dirty rivals. Assumption (2) also ensures
that all players produce positive quantities in equilibrium especially the less productively
e¢ cient players (i.e. clean competitors) when they face dirty rivals which are considered
as the more productively e¢ cient players. Finally, these assumptions dene the admissible
values of the regulatorconscience.
Proposition 3 If d > d, then the optimal per unit of emissions environmental tax im-
posed on each dirty player in the presence of m clean players is given by:
 i =
nd (m+ 1) (1 +mc)  1 mc (n+m+ 2)
n+ nd (m+ 1)2
;8i 2 N;8j 2M (15)
Proof. See Appendix B14.
Under our assumptions one may verify that the tax on dirty players is positive and
clean players remain in the market. If d  d, then the emissions tax collapses to zero.
Otherwise, the social planner will face market failure arising from underproduction unless
it uses production subsidies. In addition, we can show that @

i
@d
() > 0 and @2i
@d2
() < 0:
This means that the environmental tax is an increasing function with respect to d which
13Nonparticipation could be interpreted as bankruptcy. Thus, the regulator can be politically held
responsible for forcing rms into bankruptcy. It may even be optimal for the regulator not to induce
bankruptcy, as bankruptcy will result in a lower total contribution by rms toward remediation costs,
leaving the regulator a larger "orphan share" of the costs to fund itself. Therefore, for very high values
of d, one can not disregard the fact that the regulator may nd optimal to shut down the market.
14We can show that 8i 2 N; 8j 2M; i = (nd  1) (qi ) +

m
m+1
  
qj

. qi;i2N and q

j;j2M are dened in
Lemma 2.
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is economically intuitive since the parameter represents the marginal social damage of
emissions.
Figure 2 shows the optimal tax in the case of mixed oligopoly for admissible values of
parameters d and c. From this simulation result, we can observe how the tax changes as
a function of the number of clean and dirty players in the marketplace. More specically,
as m increases, the emission tax decreases. The presence of clean players implies an
additional product market ine¢ ciency resulting from underproduction which suggests
that the regulator decreases the tax rate.
Figure 2: The optimal tax rule for admissible values of d and c.
Proposition 4 When the regulators ecological conscience is su¢ ciently large, i.e. d 
(n+m+2)
n(m+1)
, the optimal emissions tax is increasing with respect to the technology used by
clean competitors. Otherwise, the tax rate is decreasing with c.
Proof. Dene the critical value ed  (n+m+2)
n(m+1)
; ed > d. Di¤erentiating (15) with respect to
c yields:
@ i
@c
() = m(nd(m+ 1)  (n+m+ 2))
n+ nd (m+ 1)2
(16)
Consider g(n;m) = nd(m+ 1)  (n+m+ 2): For any given n and m, the sign of equation
(16) is the sign of g(n;m). g(n;m)  0) d  ed. Thus,
@ i
@c
() =
(
> 0 if d  ed
< 0 if d < d < ed (17)
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This means that, in the presence of m clean players and n dirty players, the tax rate
paid by dirty players heavily depends on the cost of the technology used by clean rivals.
Consider the rst case when the regulators ecological conscience is su¢ ciently large.
For d  ed, environmental taxes increase with c. Under mixed oligopoly clean competi-
tors are less productively e¢ cient in the marketplace and produce less than their dirty
rivals. Thus, as a reaction, polluters behave strategically and substantially overproduce,
i.e. dirty players are more aggressive in the product market than clean players and compe-
tition between players is exacerbated. Such overproduction, however, entails an increase
in pollution, thereby inducing the regulator to respond with tougher regulation. In this
context, the only e¤ect the regulator considers is the trade-o¤ between production and
emissions levels. In order to reduce emissions, the social planner with higher environ-
mental conscience values signicantly environmental quality and sets taxes accordingly
making dirty players overproduction e¤orts more costly. In this case the government
enjoys tax revenue and a reduction in environmental damage.
Now let us look at the case when the marginal damage from pollution is in the range
of d < d < ed. For intermediate values of d, the tax magnitude decreases with c. Since
the e¢ ciency gap between clean and dirty players is small, this case does not require a
very large trade-o¤ between the industry output and the emissions levels. Thus, until the
degree of damage reaches the critical value, the regulator who is more concerned with the
market failure arising from underproduction, avoids overtaxation which entails welfare
loss, and sets emissions taxes accordingly.
Lemma 2 In the context of Cournot mixed oligopoly, if d > d then equilibrium values in
an ex ante environmental policy game are:
Total Output Q(i;j) =
1+m((m+1)(1 c)d+c)
1+d(m+1)2
Player i Output qi =
1+mc(m+2)
n+nd(m+1)2
= ei
Player j Output qj =
(m+1)((1 c)d c)
1+d(m+1)2
Price p(i;j) =
(m+1)(1+mc)d mc
1+d(m+1)2
Player i Prots i =

1+mc(m+2)
n+nd(m+1)2
2
Player j Prots j =

(m+1)((1 c)d c)
1+d(m+1)2
2
ConsumersSurplus CS(i;j) =
1
2

1+m((m+1)(1 c)d+c)
1+d(m+1)2
2
Revenue R(i;j) =

nd(m+1)(1+mc) 1 mc(h+2)
n+nd(m+1)2

1+mc(m+2)
1+d(m+1)2

Environmental Damages D(i;j) =
d
2

1+mc(m+2)
1+d(m+1)2
2
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Proof. Straightforward using equation (15) :
Note that the industry production level in equilibrium is independent of the number of
dirty players. It depends on the marginal production and abatement cost, the regulator
ecological conscience, and the number of active clean players in the industry. Furthermore,
the socially optimal output level is decreasing in the marginal and abatement cost of clean
players, decreasing in d, and increasing inm, under our assumptions, which is economically
intuitive.
@Q(i;j)
@c
() =  m(d(m+ 1)  1)
1 + d (m+ 1)2
< 0 (18)
@Q(i;j)
@d
() =  (1 +m) (1 +mc (2 +m)) 
1 + d (m+ 1)2
2 < 0 (19)
@Q(i;j)
@m
() = (d (1  c)  c)
 
d (1 +m)2   1 
1 + d (m+ 1)2
2 > 0 (20)
Figure 3: Industry output level for admissible parameter values d and c.
Figure 3 depicts the industry output level for admissible parameter values in the
m;Q(i;j)

 space in the presence of m clean players in the marketplace. It shows that
the curve representing the industry output level increases when the number of clean play-
ers m increases for di¤erent c and d values. It also shows that the curve shifts downward
as c increases and d decreases which conrms our results presented below. The increase
in the industry output in the marketplace has two opposing e¤ects on economic welfare.
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That is, an increase in the output level has a positive impact on the consumer surplus
and the regulators revenue, but results in environmental damage. In this case, the social
planner has to consider these e¤ects and their implications on social welfare. As we will
show later, under our assumptions, the positive dominates the negative e¤ect, entailing
an overall positive e¤ect on welfare.
We also can show that the individual output levels, qi and q

j , are decreasing with
respect to the number of clean players m. Di¤erentiating qi and q

j with respect to m
yields:
@qi
@m
() =   2
 
qj ()

n+ nd (m+ 1)2
< 0 (21)
and,
@qj
@m
() =  
 
d (1 +m)2   1 (d (1  c)  c) 
1 + d (m+ 1)2
2 < 0 (22)
In the absence of environmental regulation, clean players are productively ine¢ cient
and they produce less than productively e¢ cient dirty players in the marketplace. In
this case, if the number of clean players increases in the industry, then the impact of
dirty players aggressiveness is very large and the optimal non-cooperative reaction of
dirty players is to produce more. Therefore, setting an emission tax reduces polluters
production levels because environmental tax makes dirty players internalize the damage
caused by their emissions, which yields a reduction in their output levels, and hence in
the emissions levels. Thus, when the number of clean players increases, the impact of the
dirty playersaggressive behavior decreases: in front of the tax, if dirty players react by
increasing their output, they will be heavily taxed depending on their emissions. Hence, to
preserve their market power, dirty players strategic reaction is to reduce their production
level if the number of clean players increases in the industry.
Figure 4 shows dirty players output and emissions levels for admissible parameters
values in the (m;Qi ) space. The curve representing Qi decreases with the number of
clean players in the marketplace m: It shifts upwards when c increases and d decreases
which is economically intuitive.
Finally, note that one can verify that, in the market fragmentation case, the regulator
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also sets a tax below the marginal damage, MD(i;j) =
n2d(1+mc(m+2))
n+nd(m+1)2
:
 i  MD(i;j) =  
d [mc (n (m+ 2)  (m+ 1)) + (n m  1)]
1 + d (m+ 1)2
  1 +mc (h+ 2)
n+ nd (m+ 1)2
< 0 (23)
Since market power distorts the industry output level, environmental taxes are set below
the marginal damage in order to prevent any further reduction in the output.
Figure 4: Dirty players output and emissions for admissible parameters values d and c.
Proposition 5 If d > d; under a precommitment policy game, a dirty player is willing
to switch to an environment-friendly technology for the following cuto¤ values:
n  n = 1 +mc(m+ 2)
(m+ 1)(d(1  c)  c) (24)
c > c =
nd (m+ 1)  1
n (m+ 1) (1 + d) +m (m+ 2)
(25)
Proof. A typical dirty player is indi¤erent about adopting a clean technology if and only
if j = 

i . Thus,
(m+ 1) ((1  c) d  c)
1 + d (m+ 1)2
2
 

1 +mc (m+ 2)
n+ nd (m+ 1)2
2
= 0 (26)
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Solving the last relation for n and c, we obtain the particular threshold values.
In the marketplace, any dirty player has a vertical incentive to adopt a pollution-
reducing technology in order to avoid the emission tax. At the same time, it also has
a horizontal incentive to be a productive-e¢ cient dirty player since this leads a clean
player to reduce its output and, consequently, to increase its own output and prot. This
proposition states that the vertical incentive outweighs the horizontal one for the given
cuto¤ values.
Proposition 6 Within the interval of admissible values of the regulators ecological con-
science, there exists a relatively large cut-o¤ value d, namely
d  1 +mc(m+ 2) + nc (m+ 1)
n(1  c)(m+ 1) > d (27)
for which a dirty player has an incentive to adopt a clean technology.
Proof. A typical dirty player is indi¤erent between adopting the clean technology and
staying dirty if and only if the following condition is satised: j = 

i . Since d
 > d
under our assumptions15, solving this condition yields d.
Thus, a dirty player fully adopts the clean technology for any d  d. Therefore, the
decision to be environmentally clean depends on:
1. the willingness to pay for the new technology, which is in turn determined by the
adoption costs (c);
2. the number of clean players (m) which is in turn determined by the prots on the
output market those rms accrue from adopting the clean technology;
3. and nally on the values of the parameter d because an increase in environmental
stringency may encourage producers to use environmentally friendly technologies.
Proposition 7 If d > d; under an ex ante environmental policy game, dirty players are
taxed more when their rivals are also dirty than when they are clean, i.e.  (z) > 

i :
Proof. This proposition states that:
(n+m) d  1
(n+m) (d+ 1)
>
nd (m+ 1) (1 +mc)  1 mc (n+m+ 2)
n+ nd (m+ 1)2
(28)
Under Assumptions (1) and (2), using (7) and (15) in terms of the equilibrium output
levels one can verify that  =  (z)    i = dQ(z)   ndqi   mm+1qj + qi  
Q
(z)
h
> 0: The
15Since the upper bound on c is 12 , one can verify that d
 > d because d   ed > 0 and ed > d:
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sum of the rst three terms is positive and the sum of the last two terms is also positive.
This completes our proof.
This proposition means that a polluter is taxed more when rivals are also dirty than
when they are clean. The intuition behind this proposition lies on the fact that, if all
players are dirty and are using the same technology, then Cournot competition is tough
in the marketplace and the impact of dirty playersaggressiveness is very large, yielding
a larger industry production level. As a result of the over-pollution due to quantities
competition, the social planner sets higher environmental taxes to reduce environmental
damage.
The under-taxation in the mix of clean and dirty player with respect to the benchmark
case increases, other things being equal, as the level concern for environmental issues
increases, i.e. @
@d
> 0: Intuitively,  increases with d because higher environmental
quality signicantly increases environmental taxes in order to reduce emissions. Likewise,
the under-taxation increases with the cost gap between clean and dirty players for inter-
mediate values of the regulators ecological conscience, i.e. @
@c
> 0 if d < d < ed. In other
words, if the cost di¤erence between clean and dirty players is high, the regulator sets
environmental taxes accordingly, i.e. reduces emissions taxes on dirty players in the mix
case because clean players are acquiring costly equipment, and as a consequence, output
of clean player is too small. Thus, in order not to harm social welfare any further, the
regulator is forced to set lower taxes, so that dirty players do not produce an outcome
below their optimal level. Therefore, if d  ed then @
@c
< 0. This means that, for higher
values of d, the under-taxation decreases as parameter c increases. This leads to higher
taxes on dirty players in the mix case. The regulator is forced to set higher taxes in order
to reduce the environmental damage since d is too high.
From gure 5, we can observe that the di¤erence between environmental taxes increases
with the parameter d and decreases with c.
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Figure 5:  for 1  m  30; n = 30; and for admissible parameter values d and c:
In addition, we can show that, in the presence of m clean players facing n dirty players
in the marketplace, the output of a clean player is reduced with respect to the case
in which it is dirty due to its productive ine¢ ciency. Furthermore, the impact of the
dirty playersaggressive behavior decreases with the magnitude of the emission tax. This
yields a reduction in the output of a dirty player in the industry. Finally, the reduction
in the aggregate output level implies unambiguously a decrease in the aggregate levels of
emissions, E , given by the following relation:
E = 1 +mc (n+m+ 2)
1 + d (m+ 1)2
  1
(d+ 1)
=  m (m+ 2) (d (1  c)  c)
(d+ 1)
 
1 + d (m+ 1)2
 < 0 (29)
This leads the social planner to strategically set a lower environmental tax on dirty
players in the fragmentation case in order to avoid further distortions and ine¢ ciencies
in the marketplace.
As we can see in gure 6, from E ; it follows that total output is higher than the
industry production level when the used technology by all players is dirty. As a result,
consumerssurplus is larger in the market fragmentation case.
Q = Q(z)  Q(i;j) =  
m (d (1  c)  c) (d (m+ 1)  1)
(d+ 1)
 
1 + d (m+ 1)2
 < 0 (30)
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Figure 6: Q for 1  m  30; n = 30; and for admissible parameter values d and c:
3. Welfare analysis
To complete our analysis, we need now to gure out the impact of clean players on
welfare. To this end, we rst characterize the resulting welfare function in the next
proposition. Then we examine how the presence of clean players a¤ects welfare.
Proposition 8 In the context of mixed Cournot oligopoly, if d > d then ex ante environ-
mental regulation yields welfare benets of
W (i;j) =
n(n (1 + 2d)  d)
2
(qi )
2 +
m (m+ 2)
2 (m+ 1)
qj
 
2nqi + (m+ 1) q

j

(31)
Proof. Straightforward using Lemma 2 and the denition of W (i;j).
We expressed the welfare function in term of output levels for ease of presentation and
to avoid mathematical complications. Furthermore,W (i;j) can be maximized by the direct
choice of the equilibrium outputs under some mathematical conditions. W (i;j) depends on
the magnitude of the admissible parameter values of the model, and on the manner in
which clean players interact with dirty players. It also depends on whether the industry
output ameliorates or exacerbates the environmental problems.
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Figure 7: Social Welfare for 1  m  30; n = 30; and for admissible parameter values d
and c:
We can show that W (i;j) is an increasing function with respect to m. From gure 7,
it can be seen how welfare changes as a function of m clean players and for admissible
parameter values c and d: As the number of clean players increases, W (i;j) increases and
becomes atter for higher values of m. Further, an increase in c and a decrease in d shift
the curve downward which yields a lower welfare benets. In fact, when the marginal
abatement and production costs increase, clean players are less productively e¢ cient in
the marketplace. As a result, the competition in the marketplace is hard and dirty players
overproduce which yields higher pollution level above the social optimum level, thereby
generating more environmental damage. In the presence of environmental regulation,
taxation reduces dirty playersproduction thus decreasing environmental damage. The
net benet is a reduction in social welfare. Figure 7 also describes how the welfare benets
from an increase in environmental stringency: an increase in d causes dirty producers to
shift to a more environmentally friendly method of production and produces an upward
shift in the welfare benets.
Proposition 9 In the presence of m clean players in the marketplace, social welfare is
higher than that under the benchmark case, i.e. W = W (i;j)  W (z) > 0.
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Proof. Recall that
W =
(2d+ 1)

nQ(z)q

i
2
  1

  nd

Q(z)q

i
2
2

Q(z)
2
+
m (m+ 2)
2 (m+ 1)
qj
 
2nqi + (m+ 1) q

j

+
d
2 (n+m)

Q(z)
2 > 0: (32)
A simple comparison of welfare under both cases yields the results of Proposition 9.
Figure 8 gives a graphical representation of W . It depicts welfare benets in the
(m;W )-space for n = 30 and for admissible parameter values d and c. From the
numerical simulations result, we observe thatW > 0: Under emission taxes, the presence
of m clean players in the industry implies highest social welfare, since environmental
regulation induces the socially optimal output. Further, as c increases and d decreases,
the curve representing W shifts downward which is economically intuitive. Not only
that but, as the number of clean players increases in the marketplace and approaches the
number of dirty players in the industry, the curve becomes atter for a given value of
c and d. This result suggests that, even if players are symmetric in their cost structure
within each subgroup, a regulator can not underestimate the welfare benet of regulation.
Figure 8: W for 1  m  30; n = 30; and for admissible parameters values d and c:
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Conclusion and Policy Implications
If we accept that we inhabit a world with serious and severe environmental problems,
then changes that a¤ect those problems have to be undertaken. The point of environ-
mental regulation and of designing an environmental tax system is to accomplish deep
and structural changes in the economic and ecological behavior of individuals, households,
rms, and institutions in order to curtail environmentally and ecologically undesirable ef-
fects. Hence, it is reasonable that policy makers view environmental related issues through
the lens of environmental economists. That conclusion reinforces the argument in favor
of the use of market-based instruments in environmental regulation. The environmental
e¤ectiveness and economic e¢ ciency of emissions taxes could be improved further if they
are well designed and implemented.
Choosing the appropriate environmental policy is a key part of successful regulation.
Environmental taxation has been broadly analyzed in the literature on environmental eco-
nomics. Regulators often face imperfect competition and strategic behaviors. Although
many authors analyzed emission taxes in mixed duopolistic markets, there are few works
analyzing environmental policy in large oligopoly market structure and the impact of the
regulators level of concern for environmental issues on the tax setting process.
Our paper deals with market power and strategic behavior in a Cournot-type environ-
mental policy game. We kept the formalism down to a minimum focusing on simple ideas
and concepts. Obviously, our results are in part specic to our setting but they do raise
the issue that is not evident how the regulators environmental concern a¤ect the tax
setting process in a mix of clean and dirty strategic players. An interesting application
of the model is to an international carbon-energy market with countries as players. The
paper shows that emission taxes strongly depend on the market structure and are a useful
instrument for improving economic welfare. It also shows that higher taxes lower outputs
and impact welfare through two channels, pollution reduction and strategic behaviors.
The optimal taxation reduces the pollution harm and enhances social welfare.
In the benchmark case, our results are closely related to those in the literature on
environmental taxation. Therefore, important changes appear in the mixed oligopoly
case. We show that the presence of clean players in the market is welfare improving.
Furthermore, the tax design issues can have signicant e¤ects on the strategic decision of
dirty players and rely on a wide range of considerations in the presence of clean players. We
also highlight the incentives created by the use of emissions taxes to adopt environmentally
friendly technology by dirty players. Comparative statics have been performed in order
to illustrate our ndings. The results obtained and the conclusions drawn for this model
are valid for the entire range of the parameters dening the ex ante policy game.
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We are aware that our results are dened within the context of a simplied model that
is general in some respects, but they obviously depend on other less general assumptions.
For example, one of our simplications comprised the normalization of production costs
to zero. Although this variable does not a¤ect the optimal tax rates in this setting of
the model, it can easily be included. Our analysis can also be rened to include the
choice of the technology before taking any production decision. It can be extended to
include asymmetric information between the social planner and both, clean and dirty
players in the market. Interestingly, our analysis can easily be adapted to deal with other
cases which can shed more light on the optimal environmental taxes in large industrial
markets (such as mixed Bertrand oligopoly with di¤erentiated products, Hotelling spatial
competition, and even Stackelberg competition). It would be interesting to explore these
extensions in the future.
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Appendix A: The benchmark case
We study a two-stage game where, in the rst stage, the social planner selects an
emission fee  z and then all players respond by choosing an output level qz;8z 2 Z. We
assume that all players are risk neutral and are prot-maximizers. At the second period,
each player z; 8z = 1; : : : ; h; chooses qz in order to maximize its prots. Specically, a z
player solves:
max
qz
z;z2Z  (1  cz   qz   q z) qz    zez (A1)
where q z =
P
k 6=z qk is the combined output of all players except rm z.
In the case all players are supposed to be dirty, i.e. the cost gap between players is
cz = 0; the prot function for any z becomes z;z2Z  (1  qz   q z) qz    zez: Since we
simplied the problem for expositional purposes by assuming that qz = ez; then any z
player has to:
max
qz
z  (1  qz   q z    z) qz (A2)
which leads to the following rst-order conditions dening the equilibrium levels of out-
puts:
@z
@qz
() = 1  2qz   q z    z = 0 (A3)
The second-order conditions are satised:
@2z
@q2z
() =  2 < 0 (A4)
The rst-order conditions give the optimal reaction functions for all players. 8z =
1; : : : ; h:
qz =
1  q z    z
2
) q1 +   + 2qz +   + qh = 1   z (A5)
We are interested in the equilibrium in which the outcomes of all dirty players are
symmetric. In this case, 8z = 1; : : : ; h, (c1; : : : ; cz; : : : ; ch) = (0; : : : ; 0; : : : ; 0), then q1 =
   = qz =    = qh. Adding-up the rst-order conditions, we obtain an expression for
equilibrium total output:
Q(z) =
h (1   z)
h+ 1
(A6)
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and 8z = 1; : : : ; h,
qz =
(1   z)
h+ 1
(A7)
The last two equations show that raising environmental tax reduces playersindividual
production levels and the output of the industry, which causes their emissions to decrease
with the tax. It is easy now to calculate the equilibrium price:
p(z) =
1 + h z
h+ 1
(A8)
Finally, 8z = 1; : : : ; h,
(z) = (qz)
2 =

1   z
h+ 1
2
(A9)
Since the product is homogeneous, it is straightforward to compute equilibrium con-
sumerssurplus:
CS(z) =
1
2
Q2 =
1
2

h (1   z)
h+ 1
2
(A10)
Adding-up consumerssurplus and environmental damages generated by the production
activity, we obtain:
CS(z)  D(z) = 1
2
(1  d)

h (1   z)
h+ 1
2
(A11)
Let  =
P
z;z2Z (z). Since all players are dirty, then,
(z) = h

1   z
h+ 1
2
(A12)
Finally, the regulator total expected revenue generated by pollution taxes can be writ-
ten:
R(z) =
X
z;z2Z
 z

1   z
h+ 1

(A13)
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At the rst stage, the regulator sets the tax rule that maximizes the social welfare
function given by:
max
z
W(z)  1
2
(1  d)

h (1   z)
h+ 1
2
+ h

1   z
h+ 1
2
+ h z

1   z
h+ 1

(A14)
Di¤erentiating the social welfare function given in (A14) with respect to the tax gives
the solution of this optimization problem16 which yields the result presented in Proposition
1:
@W(z)
@ z
() =  h (1 + hd ( 1 +  z) + h z)
(h+ 1)2
= 0)  z =
hd  1
h (d+ 1)
It is easy to verify that the second-order conditions are satised, i.e.
@2W(z)
@2z
=  h2(d+1)
(h+1)2
<
0.
Appendix B: The market fragmentation case
Under the market fragmentation adopted in the text, n dirty players andm clean players
with h = n+m, as previously dened, 8i = 1; : : : ; n; ci;i 6=j = 0 and 8j = 1; : : : ;m; cj;i6=j =
c. Since we assumed that ei = qi then a player i; i 2 N; has to:
max
qi
i;i2N 
 
1  qi   q i  
mX
j=1
qj    i
!
qi (B1)
where q i =
P
l 6=i;i;l2N ql is the combined output of all dirty players except player i. This
leads to the following rst-order conditions dening the equilibrium levels of outputs for
any i 2 N :
@i
@qi
() = 0) 1  2qi   q i  
mX
j=1
qj    i = 0 (B2)
The second-order conditions are satised:
@2i
@q2i
() =  2 < 0 (B3)
The rst-order conditions give the optimal reaction function for each i player:
q1 +   + 2qi +   + qj +   + qh = 1   i;8i = 1; : : : ; n (B4)
16It is convenient to solve the welfare maximization problem by using the equilibrium output qz as choice
variables, and afterward infer the optimal tax. The two methodes yield the same solution.
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Now we consider players using clean technology. 8j = 1; : : : ;m; i 6= j each player j has
to:
max
qj
j;j2M 
 
1  qj   q j  
nX
i=1
qi   c
!
qj (B5)
where q j =
P
f 6=j qf is the combined output of all clean players except player j. The
rst-order conditions to maximize this prot function are:
@j
@qj
() = 0) 1  2qj   q j  
nX
i=1
qi   c = 0 (B6)
Again, the second-order conditions for a maximum is satised, i.e. @
2j
@q2j
() =  2 <
0. The rst-order conditions give the optimal reaction function for each j rm. 8j =
1; : : : ;m:
q1 +   + qi +   + 2qj +   + qh = 1  c (B7)
Adding-up the rst-order conditions for h = n + m, we obtain an expression for equi-
librium total output:
(h+ 1) (q1 +   + qz +    qh) =
 
n 
nX
i=1
 i
!
+
 
m 
mX
j=1
c
!
(B8)
Since we are interested in the equilibrium in which the outcomes of all players in each
subset are symmetric, then the last relation gives the industry output level:
Q(i;j) =
nX
i=1
qi +
mX
j=1
qj =
h  n i  mc
h+ 1
(B9)
It is easy now to calculate equilibrium price:
p(i;j) = 1 Q(i;j) = 1 + n i +mc
h+ 1
(B10)
Using the rst order conditions for any i 2 N and j 2M; i 6= j, individual output levels
in equilibrium are given by:
qi =
1  (m+ 1)  i +mc
h+ 1
(B11)
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and,
qj =
1  (n+ 1) c+ n i
h+ 1
(B12)
Finally, 8i 2 N; j 2M; prots are given by the following expressions:
i =

1  (m+ 1)  i +mc
h+ 1
2
(B13)
and,
j =

1  (n+ 1) c+ n i
h+ 1
2
(B14)
Since the product is homogeneous, it is straightforward to compute equilibrium con-
sumerssurplus,
CS(i;j) =
1
2

h  n i  mc
h+ 1
2
(B15)
Let i =
Pn
i=1 i. Then, the aggregate prots for all dirty players are:
i = n

1  (m+ 1)  i +mc
h+ 1
2
(B16)
And, if j =
Pm
j=1 j then the aggregate prots for all clean players are:
j = m

1  (n+ 1) c+ n i
h+ 1
2
(B17)
The environmental damage generated by the production activity of dirty players is
given by:
D(i;j) =
n2
2
d

1  (m+ 1)  i +mc
h+ 1
2
(B18)
Finally, the government total expected revenue generated by pollution taxes, R(i;j), can
be written:
R(i;j) = n i

1  (m+ 1)  i +mc
h+ 1

(B19)
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At the rst stage, the regulator has to determine the pollution taxes that maximize the
social welfare function dened in (5).
max
 i
W(i;j)  1
2

h  n i  mc
h+ 1
2
+n

1  (m+ 1)  i +mc
h+ 1
2
+m

1  (n+ 1) c+ n i
h+ 1
2
  n
2
2
d

1  (m+ 1)  i +mc
h+ 1
2
+ n i

1  (m+ 1)  i +mc
h+ 1

(B20)
Di¤erentiating the social welfare function with respect to the tax yields the optimal
environmental tax given in Proposition 3:
@W(i;j)
@ i
=
n
(h+ 1)2
 n i  1 + d (1 +m)2+ nd (1 +m) (1 +mc)  1 mc (m+ n+ 2) = 0
)  i =
nd (m+ 1) (1 +mc)  1 mc (n+m+ 2)
n+ nd (m+ 1)2
Again, the second-order conditions are satised, i.e.
@2W(i;j)
@2i
=  n
2(1+d(1+m)2)
(h+1)2
< 0:
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